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The paper introduces a new perspective in the vast literature devoted to the political economy of Europe and 
the U.S. American preferences for a liberal market economy are relatively clear; by contrast, European 
preferences for a social market economy remain confusing and are the subject of continuing debates in the 
field of political economy in positive as well as normative terms. Redistribution is the most usual way to deal 
with different attitudes towards inequalities in the two continents. But redistribution is not the most 
appropriate summary of what the “welfare state” in Europe actually does: social insurance mechanisms are a 
more appropriate reference. These deep and persistent differences between Europe and the U.S. are well 
interpreted in many historical and political aspects. A more theoretical perspective is developed here in five 
steps. First, those goods (health, pension, education...) with which the welfare state is concerned have 
powerful inter-temporal properties so that market solutions are not unequivocally optimal. Second, those 
goods have a strong impact on equality and modern political philosophy clarifies why their production and 
distribution should reflect considerations of justice as well as of efficiency. A two-step decision process is 
subsequently introduced: actual choices are the consumer’s job (utility maximization) but embedding fairness 
in redistributive policies or within institutions providing universal insurance lies in the citizens’ hands. Fourth, 
this choice between pure or mixed market solutions is referred to two models of political philosophies 
differently combining Liberty and Equality in the western philosophical tradition. Finally, some elements of 
the legal system are introduced as a natural bridge between the abstract formulations of collective preferences 





America and Europe are not only long-term friends and allies, they are close cousins.
2 
Looking at their political economy, they both enjoy high standards of living, they both cherish 
freedom as the basic value of society, and they both respect the rules of law and democracy.  
 
Major differences nonetheless appear as soon as one looks at social conditions. The func-
tioning of the labor market, the extent of the welfare state, attitudes towards inequalities or the 
weight of ethnic factors – to mention only a few of them – have been carefully documented and 
clearly reveal “a world of difference.”
3 It has been of constant interest to economists, as well as 
political scientists, to make these differences measurable and understandable. A quick review of 
the literature shows the amount of knowledge which has been accumulated in the recent past in 
this field and the convincing cases which have been made in developing alternatives theories.  
 
The argument I will develop in this paper is, in one sense, basic – at least at first glance. I 
will start from these differences between the two continents and consider them as expressing dif-
ferent “preferences”: how different are Americans’ and Europeans’ “revealed preferences” re-
garding the way health services are produced and distributed? What do their different attitudes 
towards inequalities reveal? Why did they come to “prefer” such different labor market institu-
tions? Finally, why do they expect such different things from public institutions and the market? 
The question is simple but, as we know, “preferences” is a tricky concept: the paper is devoted to 
making of it a workable and useful one. Key to this analysis is the way I will introduce fairness 
considerations. 
 
The paper is part of a larger research program of which it is only the first step. Subse-
quent steps will be required to explore more precisely: one, the implementation of two different 
conceptions of fairness into political and legal structures and two, the interactions of these struc-
tures or institutions with market constraints. We can expect from this research new insights in 
three main directions: one, the question of “embedded liberalism”
4 and its changing patterns over 
time; two, the future of the welfare state in challenging times on both sides of the Atlantic; and 
three, the relationship between economic and moral aspects of economic growth which has right-
ly been restored in its central place in political economy
5.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the first section introduces a slightly origi-
nal perspective on the comparison of the “welfare states” in America and Europe; in the second 
part, I document the most relevant differences between the two continents in this regard; I subse-
quently explain where I stand in the field of political economics. The fourth part focuses on fair-
                                                 
1The preparation of this paper has greatly benefited from discussions with and suggestions by A. Alesina, P. Culpep-
per, E. Glaeser, R. Freeman, C. Fried, J. Frieden, A. Goldhammer, T. Iversen, F. Michelman, and J. Ruggie at Har-
vard, H. James, P. Krugman, A. Moravcsik, and J. Pontusson at Princeton, and C. Sunstein at the University of Chi-
cago. I especially thank Peter Hall and Andrew Martin for their comments following an invitation to present the 
paper at a Center for European Studies seminar at Harvard. I gratefully acknowledge the Wiener Center on Social 
Policies and the Center on Business and Government for hosting me at the Kennedy School of Government during 
this research. 
2C. Patten (2005) is a fascinating introduction to this relationship in recent years. 
3This is the subtitle of Alberto Alesina and Edward Glaeser’s book (2004), which will frequently be referred to in 
the following pages. 
4The term is borrowed from John Ruggie (1982) and remains one of the most expressive ones in this matter. 
5Benjamin Friedman (2005).    
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ness and is devoted to introducing the specificities and properties of those goods – inter-temporal 
goods – which are the main concern of the social state; next, I build on recent achievements in 
the field of political economics to distinguish between marginal changes within and structural 
differences between social and political institutions. The next section is an excursion in compara-
tive political philosophy to investigate the foundations of two different conceptions of economic 
and social fairness. The seventh section refers to legal systems as a valuable expression of dif-
ferent collective preferences. The conclusion briefly summarizes the major findings and explores 
the next steps for research.  
 
1. “Liberal America vs. Social Europe?”
6 
 
Over the last twenty years or so, the comparative study of advanced capitalist economies 
and welfare states has generated a rich and diverse literature. The difference between America –
liberal – and Europe – social – seems nothing but evident. Europe is sometimes presented as 
“U.S.A. plus,”
7 because of its generous social protection. On the other side, it is too easy to de-
nounce Europe as “U.S.A. minus” due to its lack of flexibility and its enduring underperfor-
mance.
8 Finally, what “Europe” means is not clear at all. No reasonable public debate can 
emerge from this confusion.
9 Despite huge efforts, we still need to clarify the issue at stake in 
such a comparison.  
 
Comparative political economy is based on the idea that advanced capitalist societies dif-
fer in limited but meaningful ways. Recent literature offers a number of comparisons and typolo-
gies. The basic distinction has been introduced by Peter Katzenstein, distinguishing “liberal,” 
“statist” and “corporatist” political economies; this typology is based on the organization of in-
terest groups and the role of bureaucrats. Gosta Esping-Andersen (1990) tells the story of three 
distinct welfare states; he distinguishes “liberal,” “social-democrat” and “conservative” models 
and emphasizes the role of these differences, rather than autonomous market forces, when mov-
ing to a postindustrial system. Goodin et alii (1999) present “[T]he real world of welfare states” 
as a competition where the “social-democrat” model takes the lead, “being uniquely well suited 
to realise all these social and economic objectives(!).” Huber and Stephens (2001) also develop a 
carefully documented version of the “power-constellation” theory which adds to the traditional 
central role of labor and identifies a significant influence of Christian Democratic parties and 
women’s movements. The present research naturally draws on these contributions (and others 
which will be more precisely introduced later), but my goal is different in three respects. 
 
First, I do not wish to enrich existing typologies that already encapsulate so many signifi-
cant aspects of the European patchwork. Typologies should not be seen as tools as rigid as the 
Mendeleieff classification of elements: putting the Netherlands precisely somewhere between 
Germany and the UK is not the only way to improve our understanding of the European welfare 
state. Introducing a lot of countries can divert attention rather than enrich the interpretation. Pro-
fusion of data can be misleading if not informed by a solid theoretical model.  
 
                                                 
6This expression figures in the title of Jonas Pontusson (2005). 
7T.R Reid (2004). 
8Jens Alber (2006).  
9Cf. the weak substance of the summit of the European Union summoned on this issue by the British Presidency at 
Hampton Court in autumn 2005.   
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Europe is made up of diverse countries with long histories and complex sociopolitical ar-
rangements, and it comes as no surprise that they produced such a rich variety of institutions.
10 
Scandinavia, for example, is a fascinating group of countries which has been carefully studied; 
now, with twenty million people, their population is on a par with Minnesota, Wisconsin and 
Washington state.
11 It could very well be that variance among American states is as high as 
among European nations;
12 that, for example, makes sense if you consider poverty rates which 
vary from 12.3 percent in North and South Dakota to 26.3 percent in New York state, as com-
pared with European rates ranging from 2.4 percent in Sweden to 12.5 percent in Spain. Diver-
sity is a natural attribute of a continent.
13 
 
Different goals clearly require different samples; I turn to clarifying my goal. There 
seems to be a very large consensus about what the welfare state is all about: it’s a matter of redis-
tribution.
14 No one can underestimate the importance of this aspect of the socioeconomic equa-
tion. Payments are made, incomes are taxed, and the whole stuff is redistribution. I will nonethe-
less take a different perspective. In broader, fundamental terms, the welfare state is about fair-
ness. Income redistribution is a tool; the point is that fairness is not reducible to “payments to the 
poor.” Two observations give a better understanding of this question. 
 
 Income redistribution seems to be a matter of correcting market excesses. As Benjamin 
Friedman recently argued, extravagant inequalities fuel, in Durkheim’s words, a sense of anomie 
which endangers the social fabric. Correcting market forces is an appropriate answer when the 
game is too hard for some or when the result is unwelcome for social or moral reasons. But the 
issue goes further and could preferably be seen as a way of embedding market forces. Goods like 
health services, pension systems, labor force or environmental protection are misleadingly 
treated in the same way as cars, airline tickets, insurance premiums or telephone services. The 
crucial difference is that present levels of consumption don’t disappear into present utility but 
make strong interpersonal and inter-temporal connections. A short summary is at this stage a 
clear introduction to further developments (section 4): if you are poor and if you drive your chil-
dren in a used car, it has no dynamic consequences, but the same is clearly not true when it 
comes to education or health. As compared with many existing views, I will consequently argue 
that looking to redistribution as such and treating the set of “goods” as a flat continuum is mis-
leading. Fairness is not only a matter of ex-post redistribution but of ex-ante access to certain 
goods. For those goods, efficiency is definitely not the only required benchmark; justice is part 
of the issue; political and moral considerations are of primary importance.  
 
It is thus appropriate to consider the conditions of choice (according to which standards 
and rules should health services be delivered to the community?) before studying actual choices 
                                                 
10Richard Freeman (1998) rightly observes that “the institutions and rules of the labor market are among the most  
country-specific.” 
11On top of that argument, we can also notice with Tony Judt (2005) that the Scandinavian welfare model not only 
differs from the rest of Europe, but that each of those states is itself quite different from the others. 
12Tim Smeeding (2006) emphasized this aspect. 
13Putnam (2000) produces (in the fourth section of the book) a lot of evidence and comments on social capital, edu-
cation, and health differences among the fifty states. 
14Persson and Tabellini (2002) devote the first part of their textbook to methodology and the second part to “substan-
tive policy issues” which means: “redistributive policies.” I return to their contribution later on.   
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(how much is spent for health vs. entertainment?).
15 The latter choice is rightly considered to be 
in the hands of the consumer, but the former is a citizens’ task: democratically expressed prefer-
ences reflect the extent to which market solutions are trusted in order to rule the production and 
distribution of those goods.  
 
This paper’s goal can now be precisely formulated. If differences between “Liberal” and 
“Social” capitalist economies are really important and robust, as will be confirmed in the next 
section, that calls for a fundamental, not an incidental, explanation. This is why the paper has a 
theoretical as well as an empirical part. The theoretical part deals with feasible conceptions of 
justice in a market economy: we need to distinguish the foundations, logic and persistence of two 
plausible socioeconomic regimes within the broad and common framework of a market econ-
omy/political democracy. The empirical part is concerned with qualifying what is quintessen-
tially liberal in the American welfare state, what is quintessentially European among the diver-
sity of European nations.  
  
Now, a big preliminary question remains: what should we call “Europe”? With this goal 
in mind, we would for example like to start with a comparison between the U.S. and the Euro-
zone or the Union.
16 Unfortunately we still do have not appropriate data for this particular re-
gional configuration; political and social institutions also differ significantly within the Euro-
zone. I will consequently focus on a limited number of big European economies: France, Ger-
many and the UK. Together, they account for more than 200 million inhabitants, two-thirds of 
the population of the U.S. But there is more than demography here.  
 
A political economy approach should naturally be based on appropriate political grounds. 
It is surprising that the literature specifically dealing with the welfare state so rarely treats France 
and Germany as close companions. To be sure, there were and there are a lot of institutional dif-
ferences and specificities.
17 Besides, when visiting Texas and Minnesota, it is more than visible 
that American states can deeply differ in major cultural and institutional aspects without ceasing 
to be truly “American.” That could suggest putting Franco-German differences and similiarities 
under a different light. 
 
France and Germany dramatically changed in the latter half of the last century and these 
economic and political transformations are part of a common adventure.
18 These two countries 
                                                 
15This observation has clear consequences about the perception and measurement of poverty; the relatively high 
level of consumption of durable (used) goods by poor people in industrialized countries, in particular in the U.S., is 
sometimes viewed as testimony that poverty today is very much different from what it was in the past; severely un-
equal access to education or health care is described in specialized reports but rarely inserted as a major factor into 
aggregate measures of poverty. 
16V. Schmidt (2004) introduces the brilliant innovation of a “ Regional State.”  
17Germany is well identified as was France in the past (classified as “statist”); since its rapid opening up and trans-
formations, France is frequently but unsubstantially qualified as “hybrid.” The best analysis of this “Changing 
France” is offered by Pepper Culpepper, Peter Hall and Bruno Palier (2006); see also P. Culpepper (2006). Philip 
Gordon and Sophie Meunier (2001) subtly describe the “stealth reforms” that have transformed the country during 
the last twenty years.  
18Remember that the starting point was the Schuman plan, announced on May 9, 1950, and immediately welcomed 
by the German government. Tony Judt (2005) quotes Konrad Adenauer as saying that “this plan of the French gov-
ernment has given the relations between the two countries – which threatened to be paralyzed by mistrust – a fresh 
impetus towards constructive cooperation” (p. 157). Harold James (1989) describes the close relationship between 
Adenauer and De Gaulle as “an association of German economic strength and French political assertion”; finally,   
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are frequently seen as the “engine” of European construction. There is probably no other exam-
ple in history of two nations’ destinies being so strongly intertwined. From the beginning in the 
1950s (ECSC and EURATOM) to the launching of the Euro in the 1990s, France and Germany have 
been sharing in a European project which has conversely deeply transformed their domestic con-
ditions. It is of great interest to measure how much their respective “welfare states,” all consid-
erations due to country-specific attributes, reflect this parallelism.
19 As regards the UK, its pres-
ence is more than natural due to its “special” relationship both with the U.S. … and with the 
EU.
20 Now, I turn to the substance.  
 
2. A World of Difference, Which Difference? 
 
Conventional wisdom has it that market forces have been on the rise during the last two 
decades, and that is undoubtedly true.
21 This is evident for the U.S. As regards Europe, the UK is 
leading these transformations but a simple look at France – the former quintessential example of 
“state capitalism” – testifies as well to the deep reforms that have been aggressively pursued in 
Western Europe.
22 Even if some steps remain to be taken, on both continents, even if “economic 
patriotism” or “national strategic interests” episodically recall old rhetoric, there is clearly no 
question about market forces as determining the day-to-day workings of the economy on both 
sides of the Atlantic: prices of cars, airlines tickets, telephone services, insurance premiums, not 
to mention interest and exchange rates, which are now globally determined. 
 
Conventional wisdom goes farther and has it that the welfare state should in the same 
movement be dramatically eroded.
23 The balance of power is said to have fundamentally shifted 
towards capital. This redeployment is supposedly driven by the forces of globalization and tech-
nological change, whose pressure is inescapable and should push major industrialized economies 
closer to a common model. One has read this story under different brands,
24 one can even en-
dorse it as a normative statement.
25 But, entering the twenty-first century, is it really an appropri-
ate summary of actual American and European trajectories?  
 
I will check if recent trends regarding inequalities, access to health services, pension pro-
visions, labor-market institutions or environmental norms are significantly, even if partially, con-
                                                                                                                                                               
under Mitterrand and Kohl, “a rapprochement with Paris offered a more certain relationship than the instability of 
the Bonn-Washington relations, ... a way of reconstructing a more assertive style of German politics.” 
19Michel Albert (1992) was one of the first to formalize the proximity of continental capitalisms in Europe under the 
label “the Rhine model” as distinct from the “Anglo-Saxon” one. 
20This sample in some sense reflects the typology of Chris Patten’s book, whose subtitle is: “America, Britain and 
Europe.” 
21D. Yergin and J. Stanislaw (1998) remain a vivid introduction to the ongoing “remaking of the modern world.” 
22Vivien Schmidt (2002), Philip Gordon, and Sophie Meunier (2001), and the contributions by Pepper Culpepper, 
Bob Hancké, and Stewart Wood in Peter Hall and David Soskice (2001). 
23Evelyn Huber and John Stephens (2001) give a very systematic and sober interpretation of the transformation of 
the welfare states “after the golden age.” 
24Bill Emmott (2003) or Martin Wolff (2004) are my favorites in this regard. Going a step further, and concluding in 
the opposite direction, Ezra Suleiman (2003) fears that “relentless attacks and denigration of the state” and of its 
professional bureaucracy are a threat to democracy. 
25Paul Pierson, ed. (2001) is a good example of this idea that, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the major 
issue regarding the welfare state was no longer the question of “retrenchment” but the need to reform and modern-
ize; see also footnote 27; an interesting illustration of this movement to reform and modernize is given in France by 
R. Fauroux and B. Spitz (2004), to which I contributed (in J. Mistral [2004], “L’Etat-providence en faillite”).    
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verging between the U.S. and the EU.
26 I distinguish in this regard two sets of data, inputs (ex-
penditures, regulations, laws), and outputs (measurable results); emphasis will be put on the fact 
that, in economic terms, European institutions are better seen as an insurance scheme rather than 
as redistribution engines.  
 
The welfare state in Europe is under stress for reasons which have been excellently docu-
mented.  
 
Its “retrenchment” has provoked a huge literature since the middle of the 1990s. The first 
phase was focused on the consequences of the Reagan-Thatcher policies (see, for example, P. 
Pierson [1995]); a second wave extended investigations to other countries and policies and pro-
posed a view where retrenchment appeared pervasive but the basic contour of the welfare state 
remained intact (see, for example, Huber and Stevens [2001]). Finally, the welfare state clearly 
remains a dominant feature of western European societies (Table 1). Two sorts of broad meas-
ures are available. The size of gross social expenditure, the most trivial indicator, is approximate-
ly twice as high in France and Germany (28 percent of GDP) as in the U.S. (14.8 percent), the UK 
being in the middle (21.4 percent) as it will show in many aspects, not all. Other indicators ini-
tially produced by the OECD offer a metric to measure the extent of social protection, both in the 
labor market and in terms of income. Even with diagnosed weaknesses,
27 these statistics are ro-
bust and eloquent enough to serve as a good starting point. Ranking industrialized countries on a 
scale from 0 to 1, the U.S., the UK, France and Germany are respectively at .14, .25, .61, and .86 
for the synthetic “employment protection index” calculated by T. Iversen (2005) at .10, .22, .46, 
and .52 for the “income protection index.” Simply said, the welfare state in continental Europe 
remains far away from U.S. standards.  
 
TABLE 1: A LOOK AT THE DATA / INPUTS 
 
U.S. UK  FRANCE GERMANY
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION INDEX (SCALE) 
0.14 0.25 0.61  0.86 
GROSS PUBLIC SOCIAL EXPENDITURE (% GDP) 
14.8 21.4 28.5  27.4 
SOCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS – INCOME TAX (% TOTAL)
23.3 – 42.3  16.4-30.2 33.9-17.7  37-27.1 
REAL FUEL PRICE (US$ / LITER) 
0.25 0.9 0.8  0.7 
 
Regarding resources, the most important point is that the continental European welfare 
state does not principally rely on direct taxation properly said. Income taxes represent 17.7 and 
                                                 
26The best synthetic reference here is Peter Lindert (2004) whose main conclusions are: 1) that the spread of democ-
racy has (generally speaking) played a major role in propagating social goals and expenditures; and 2) that financing 
these expenditures does not prove severely weakening to economic incentives and long-term performance, as fre-
quently asserted, for example, by Tanzi and Schucknecht (2000). I share Lindert’s view, which is exemplified in 
simple terms by the insufficiently well publicized fact that average growth per capita in France and the U.S. during 
the last quarter of a century has been … exactly the same (2 percent p.a.).  
27Aggregation procedures (normalization, weighs) are recognized limits of these indexes; they are not available for 
recent years – but it is reasonable to suppose that the huge divergences that they document have not significantly 
changed in the most recent period.   
  8
27.7 percent of total public resources in France and Germany as compared with 30.2 and 42.3 
percent in the UK and the U.S. More generally, it has frequently been observed that direct taxa-
tion of households and companies was at a low level in continental Europe: in 2003, taxes on in-
come and profits represented 10.1 and 9.7 percent of GDP in France and Germany; they peak at 
13.0 and 11.1 percent in the UK and the U.S. (after a dramatic reduction in this country, from 15 
percent in the 1990s). We will come back to this issue later when comparing different logics for 
the welfare state.  
 
Briefly said, there has been little retreat in the welfare state’s intervention in continental 
Europe,
28 high public expenditures and powerful institutions remain in the early twenty-first cen-
tury a clear testimony to the reality of “embedded capitalism.” After describing the “inputs,” I 
now turn to their results, the output of the social state (Table 2).  
 
Income inequality differences are among the first and the most striking results. Gini coef-
ficients are at 35.7 and 32.6 for the U.S. and the UK as compared with 27.3 and 27.7 for France 
and Germany, a difference which has been extensively documented and rationalized in the recent 
past.
29 But, as explained in the first section, the goal of the welfare state cannot be reduced to re-
distribution per se; fair access to a range of economic amenities would be, at least for Europe, a 
more appropriate mission statement (more on that later). Without pretending to be exhaustive, a 
few significant trends are possibly more meaningful than differences in income distribution.  
 
Table 2: A LOOK AT THE DATA / OUTPUTS 
 
U.S. UK  FRANCE  GERMANY 
 
INCOME INEQUALITY (DISP INC. GINI/P90-P10) 
35.7/5.4 32.6/4.2  27.3/3.4  27.7/3.5 
Child/Old Age Poverty (%) 
21.7/24.6 16.2/14.4  7.3/10.5  12.8/8.5 
HEALTHY LIFE EXP. (YRS) – INFANT MORTALITY (0/00) 
69.3/6.8 70.6/5.3  72.0/4.2  71,8/4.3 
NET REPLACEMENT RATE/RETIREMENT (%) 
51 48  69  70 
FUEL USE (GJ/CAP.) – CO2 EMISSIONS (TONS/CAP) 
52 – 19.7  17 – 8.4  16 – 6.2  19 – 10.2 
 
First, Europeans regard their health system as a major achievement of the social state. A 
few figures convincingly illuminate why. Healthy life expectancy is at 69.3 years in the U.S., 
70.6 in the UK, 72.0 in France and 71.8 in Germany; infant mortality, frequently seen as a sum-
mary result of the health production function, is at 6.8 per thousand, 5.3, 4.2 and 4.3 in our four 
countries. For elderly people, the replacement rate for retirement is at 51 percent in the U.S., 48 
percent in the UK, 69 and 70 percent in France and Germany; subsequently, poverty rates for 
seniors are higher in the Anglo-Saxon countries (24.6 and 14.4 percent) than in the continental 
                                                 
28This cautious conclusion is reinforced in recent studies; see the detailed analysis and balanced comments of Jonas 
Pontusson (2005); at the extreme, P. Lindert (2005) concludes that “[T]he welfare state is not an endangered species 
among OECD countries.”  
29A. Alesina and Ed. Glaeser (2004).   
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countries (10.5 and 8.5 percent). Labor-market statistics are the usual companion to welfare ex-
penditures; there we find negative results for the continental European countries: unemployment 
is much higher, periods of unemployment are much longer, jobs created in the service industry 
fewer. This is a fascinating element in the comparison: more jobs and more poverty in the U.S., 
higher unemployment and lower poverty in Europe. Following the strong case made by A. 
Alesina and E. Glaeser, it is now well-known but still striking to observe that, for a majority of 
Americans, poverty mainly reflects a personal failure, while the poor are mainly considered to be 
trapped by Europeans. The most recent element in this debate, and one whose meaning is more 
disturbing as compared with traditional prejudices, is that intergenerational mobility in the U.S., 




These differences are most frequently described by reference to the extent of redistribu-
tion. I see three reasons to explain why redistribution is naturally favored as a methodological 
tool. First “redistribution” fits well within economic teachings and models: taxes and subsidies 
are easy to manipulate. Second, the U.S. model of the welfare state (Medicaid, welfare properly 
said) is relatively well in line with this description (even if Medicare and Social security are im-
portant elements on the social insurance side
31). Third, income distribution is much more equal 
in Europe, and this seems more than likely to reflect (presupposed) redistributive policies. I 
nonetheless see a major problem here which has not attracted sufficient attention: this model of 
the welfare state is simply not well adapted to European policies.  
 
Table 3 : “VALUE FOR MONEY” (% of GDP) 
WELFARE SPENDING vs. SOCIAL INSURANCE 
 
U.S. UK FRANCE GERMANY 
Social Expenditure 
14.8  21.8 28.5  27.4 of which
« Insurance » 
14.1 20.3 25.1  23.7 
PENSIONS 
6.1 8.3  11.9  11.2 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
1.8 5.9  6.0  4.5 
HEALTH 
6.2 6.1  7.2  8.0 
« PURE Social Expenditure» 
0.7 1.5  3.4  3.6 
 
The relationship of the middle class to the welfare state is poorly captured by the usual 
economic model of redistribution. For a typical European family, for example, “taxes” pay for 
college tuition and social contributions pay for the family’s health expenditures and future pen-
                                                 
30See J. Ferrie (2005). Jacques Mistral and Bernard Salzmann (2006) give a detailed assessment of the empirical lit-
erature on inequalities, social mobility and the functioning of the labor market in the U.S.; many more empirical ref-
erences are provided there. 
31As a matter of fact, Social Security proved again to be the “third rail of American politics,” when the newly re-
elected President tried to reform it in 2005.   
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sion, and that makes a huge difference from the similar American family. Except in the UK, so-
cial contributions are not part of the Government budget; they should consequently not be con-
fused with taxes, they are closer to insurance premiums.
32 Three arguments substantiate this 
comparison:  
 
1.) These premiums pay, as naively exemplified above, for private consumption and, as 
with car insurance, the scheme is (roughly speaking) universal: every household pays for 
receiving a personal service;  
 
2.) The amount of the premium is best seen as reflecting a price rationality: covering the 
cost of the service is the major determinant of the price (and it is far from clear that the 
excessively decentralized system of the U.S. is administratively more “efficient” than the 
public centralized ones);  
 
3.) In private as well as in public insurance, there is an important element of mutuality, 
since the service one will receive is not known with certainty.  
 
These elements do not fit with redistributive policies (“tax and spend”); they rather reflect 
the very logic of the insurance industry. The main specificities of universal social protection in 
Europe can thus best be summarized by two considerations: 1.) Availability is much greater for 
health care and pensions; 2.) Pricing actually includes a stronger redistributive element. It seems 
consequently a wise precaution to move away from a caricature of the European welfare state: to 
assert that a massive and irresponsible bureaucracy governs the health of French or German citi-
zens, as ideologues sometimes assert, and that this system relies on heavily taxing the rich to pay 
for the poor, is grossly misleading. This is why we will take the two different forms of the wel-
fare or social state, mainly redistributive policies in the U.S. as against mainly insurance institu-
tions in Europe as the major question in this research. Could this difference reflect differences in 
the perception of economic and social fairness? 
 
                                        
 
Environmental protection as a social good 
 
It makes sense to add an unexpected guest to this discussion: environmental protection. 
Oil consumption has nothing to do with the “welfare state” as such, but it is directly linked to the 
mix of citizens’ concerns in which we are interested when looking to health or retirement or la-
bor protection. Despite its apparent simplicity as a commodity, oil is a good example of a “good” 
encapsulating much more complexity than other standard consumer goods (see Daniel Yergin 
[1992]). This example can help in our understanding of other differences in the more institution-
alized world of social protection. And it is such a visible difference between Europe and Amer-
ica! 
 
On the “input” side, taxation of gas is a distinctive feature of European countries, even in 
energy-rich countries. In the good old days, before the recent hike, the price of fuel was as low as 
twenty-five cents a liter in the U.S. and close to eighty cents a liter in our three European coun-
                                                 
32K. Ove Moene and M. Wallerstein (2001) make a similar case and develop a formal model, making explicit the en-
dogenous support for welfare policies enacted as insurance rather than redistributive policies. The same authors 
(2003) develop a series of reasons why insurance against risks could be higher in countries with lower inequalities.   
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tries. Turning to the output, I pick up carbon dioxide emissions as the environmental measure of 
consumers’ and citizens’ preferences regarding the environment: 19.7 tons per capita in the U.S., 
6 in France (nuclear power), 8 in the UK and 10 in Germany (coal and lignite). 
 
This could be seen as an interesting paradox. No one will support the idea that Europeans 
“love” these taxes, but the high price of gas is fundamentally accepted in Europe because “high 
tax” is well understood as an incentive for improving fuel efficiency; it is seen as an appropriate 
solution to the management of an exhaustible resource; and all this is linked to the question of 
global warming. It doesn’t look like as a confiscatory tax; it’s rather considered as a shadow 
price. Couldn’t this be considered proper economic reasoning? 
 
                                        
 
This short survey finally adds four conclusions to the existing literature.  
 
First, the idea of converging trends between the U.S. and the EU is not confirmed by the 
data; they simply illustrate a possible confusion between analytic and normative positions: it is 
clear that the social state in Europe urgently needs to be reformed; however, it is one thing to 
recommend reforms, it is another to explain the actual rationale of changes on both sides of the 
Atlantic, and convergence is not necessarily the winning argument in this regard.  
 
Second, France and Germany
33 present many more common points than are usually seen; 
these two countries have been the political engine of the European project; on top of that, and de-
spite their initial differences, the social fabric built during the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury reveals very deep similarities.  
 
Third, it is striking that the European social system, based on universal coverage, is not a 
kingdom of insiders fighting to preserve their privileges; the result of the social state is certainly 
built upon a strong influence of well organized labor and political forces but, as the data clearly 
demonstrate, actual access to social protection in contemporary industrialized economies is much 
more unequal when it is inspired by the idea of “targeting the needy.”
34,35  
 
Finally, the form of the “welfare state” is as important as its extent: we want to under-
stand why Europeans preferred designing institutions closer to a sort of non-market insurance 
industry than to a redistributive scheme. In other words, the question is not about actual choices 
(more or less redistribution) but rather why one continent offers one set of choices and the other 
                                                 
33Whether this parallelism should be extended to “continental Europe” remains at that stage an interesting question.  
34This is why I will not follow in section 6 the “Political Theory of the Welfare State” developed by Robert Goodin 
(1988), since he restricts welfare “to relieving distress among the neediest members of the community”; even if he 
does not object in principle to extending social benefits more widely, there are many broader questions here: are the 
truly needy a sufficient political force to get traction in the political process? are the means of targeting welfare to 
this population a source of bureaucratic mismanagement and an obstacle to citizenship? is the truly needy person 
still a member of the community? or a pariah? These are questions which clearly need further elaboration.  
35The American Political Science Association gives in its “Report on Inequality and Democracy” (2004) a possible 
reason for this situation: “citizens with lower incomes speak with a whisper that is lost on the ears of inattentive 
officials while the advantaged roar with a clarity that policy-makers readily hear and routinely follow”; the Report 
fears that “the historic accomplishments of the rights revolution are now threatened by widening economic and po-
litical inequalities.” This is not far from Benjamin Friedman’s remarks on the same issue. See also Martin Gilens 
(2004).   
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another set. Now, what is the appropriate theoretical framework for understanding these prefer-
ences?  
 
3. Questions for Political Economists 
 
As an economist, I would have liked to get economic explanations for these preferences. 
Very interesting aspects have been highlighted in recent research after this sort of issue clearly 
became a renewed center of interest. Olivier Blanchard convincingly described what can be un-
derstood as a “preference for leisure” by European workers; he also offered an already classic 
reference for describing what we know and what we don’t regarding the specificities of the labor 
market in Europe, finally integrating factors like trust in industrial relations and civic virtues.
36 
Alesina and La Ferrara, Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln, or Benabou and Ok, among others, ad-
vanced different explanations of attitudes towards redistribution. The main result in this regard is 
that a “preference for social mobility” in the U.S. (real or supposed) is viewed as a substitute for 
redistributive policies. In the field of international trade, Pascal Lamy recently described statu-
tory rules (technical standards, safety procedures…) as expression of “national collective prefer-
ences.”
37 To cope with these issues, generally speaking, pure economic considerations are fre-
quently viewed as not powerful enough;
38 other elements are clearly needed. Alesina and Glaeser 
elegantly refer these differences to different political institutions. Since political institutions in 
the nineteenth century were everywhere “conservative,” they ask why conservatives in the U.S. 
have been able to maintain conservative institutions that were dramatically altered in Europe dur-
ing the twentieth century. They point to a major difference in the ethnic fractionalization of the 
country, which has constantly been an obstacle to ambitious redistribution policies in the U.S. 
The chapters devoted to these two aspects are fascinating.  
 
Back to economics. Alesina and Angeletos (2003) build a model describing interactions 
between social beliefs (another approach of collective preferences) and welfare policies. If a so-
ciety “believes” that luck, birth or connections determine wealth, it will tax a lot, distorting allo-
cations and making these beliefs self-sustained. If instead the society believes in the virtues of 
effort, it will choose low redistribution and in equilibrium the role of luck will actually be lim-
ited.
39 This is a fascinating story, exhibiting multiple equilibria depending on the vision the soci-
ety has of itself. In this vein, I will precisely explore the foundations of different “beliefs” and 
how they turned into practical realities. Now, remember that America and Europe do not only 
differ in the extent of their redistributive policies. The European specificity, if any, goes beyond 
money transfers; it fundamentally involves the whole organization of major industries. This 
question is related to the respective roles of the market and the state. We turn to recent major 
contributions in this field.  
 
We cannot underestimate in this regard the recent contributions of the “Varieties of capi-
talism” school. Peter Hall and David Soskice (2001) have developed a powerful representation of 
                                                 
36O. Blanchard (2004) (2005). 
37Different visions of GMOs in America and Europe exemplify the point; trade negotiations on those obstacles prove 
much more difficult to conclude than about tariffs: interests invested in “preferences” are frequently more deeply 
rooted than traditional protectionist claims; see P. Lamy (2005).  
38According to Alesina and Glaeser, they leave us “almost completely empty handed.” 
39Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2005) propose another example of interaction between individual preferences and 
past social experiments in comparing the surviving preferences of East Germans for high levels of redistribution and 
describe their progressive convergence towards the western level.   
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the differences between “liberal” and “coordinated” market economies; they have built a firm-
centered political economy that allows them to go step by step from institutions to behaviors and 
to strategic interactions between economic actors. This articulation of micro- and macro-
determinants of national differences certainly is a model for further research. At the heart of their 
demonstration is the difference between two education and training systems, based on general 
education in the U.S. or in the UK, on vocational training in Germany and, in a lesser way, 
France.  
 
Following the same argument and closer to our own research, Torben Iversen (2005) has 
demonstrated how these differences in skill systems precisely generate different models of the 
welfare state. Skills are used as the basis of an asset theory of individual preferences, which es-
tablishes a connection among individuals’ preferences, political choices and social institutions. 
This, again, is a model for those who want to elucidate the interaction of national specificities 
and external pressures in an era of globalization.  
 
The different organization of the health or pension systems in America
40 and continental 
Europe notwithstanding remains a puzzle. Indeed, it can be argued that, after World War II, the 
American solution of the 1960s and 1970s could have been perfectly adequate to protect the in-
terests of skilled workers and could very much have been implemented in Europe in the follow-
up to the Marshall plan. General Motors employees were not so very different in this regard from 
Volkswagen’s or Renault’s. The fact is that, post-World War II, stronger forces have pushed 
workers, voters and governments in America and Europe to look actively for very different solu-
tions;
41 these different forces do not seem to have exhausted their influence today. 
 
We have made some progress in identifying useful tools in the recent literature. At its 
roots, the welfare state is concerned with correcting market forces when income distribution ap-
pears inadequate for exogenous reasons (the Musgrave argument). And that opens a wide area 
for political analysis; the danger here is of this interaction being wrongly presented as politics 
against markets. A more qualified understanding of the interplay between markets and institu-
tions is consequently needed. “VoC” studies, which are presently the most promising path in this 
direction, make the economic agents able not only to play the market game but to frame the 
rules; if considered as strategic agents, workers and companies transform their environment. But 
the extent and the form of the European welfare state is not reducible to this explicit coordination 
of market actors.  
 
It is now possible to clarify my position in the field of political economy. Correcting mar-
ket forces and coordinating market actors are two eminent avenues for understanding the differ-
ence between America and Europe; a third way which I will explore now can be described as 
“circumscribing market solutions.” The crucial difference we have emphasized lies in the extent 
to which market forces are trusted for delivering those particular goods with which the welfare or 
the social state are concerned. Different national preferences can shape different institutions that 
govern the production and circulation of goods in a large part of the economy. Now, what is so 
specific about those goods which Europeans, at least partially, subtract from market forces? 
 
                                                 
40According to J. Richmond and R. Fein (2005), employer-based insurance – which is a peculiarly American institu-
tion – could very well be the result of historical accident rather than of deliberate policy.  
41More on this aspect in section 7.   
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4. What’s the Matter with “Inter-temporal Goods”? 
 
The beauty of the modern theory of value, as exemplified by Debreu’s book, lies in its 
purity. Consider the starting point. The space of goods is {i}, the space of agents is {j}, the initial 
endowments are {wi,j}, no need to elaborate, that’s self-sufficient. And that has also been suffi-
cient to fuel innumerable developments. The extraordinary power of the theory lies in its coher-
ence and constructive potential. By the way, with this model, we also inherit a vision of the econ-
omy composed of a flat continuum of goods. But what about health? Pensions? Jobs? Global 
warming? Should we more precisely qualify those goods identified in the previous sections? 
 
Economists have developed a long series of sub-definitions about goods. In pursuit of dif-
ferent goals, they have distinguished commodities, inferior goods, luxury goods, durable goods, 
capital goods, traded goods, public goods, merit goods and illegal goods, to enumerate only a 
few of them. These typologies have mainly practical purposes: organizing statistical data, study-
ing behaviors, designing policy recommendations. But recognizing the wide diversity of goods 
immediately raises important theoretical questions. Suffice it to mention the names of Veblen or 
Duesenberry – and the persistent relevance
42 of their contributions – to remember the complexi-
ties underlying the very notion of the space of goods as soon as we leave pure market considera-
tions and put behaviors into their social context. Modern political philosophy suggests two major 
reasons why we have to be more careful with those goods which are deeply involved in the so-
cial fabric. 
 
Promoting some sort of egalitarianism is at the core of any normative theory. In purely 
economic terms, fairness is a matter of redistribution – which means monetary transfers. But 
normative theories of justice put emphasis on a different approach when considering that certain 
goods are of central concern: income and wealth naturally, jobs and educational opportunities, 
health care and retirement and, more fundamentally, autonomy and self-esteem, power and au-
thority. John Rawls certainly played a leading role in opening up this new avenue when introduc-
ing the idea of “primary goods,” followed by Ronald Dworkin asserting the idea of equal access 
to resources. Serious difficulties immediately arise, which nourished a huge literature. There is, 
for example, no canonical list of primary goods, and only the idea of a “list” of primary goods – 
whose distribution has to be optimized in some sense – directly, raises the question of aggrega-
tion.
43 I do not engage in this debate and will rely on Miller’s appreciation that there is “a mov-
able boundary between justice-relevant and justice-irrelevant goods, the position of the boundary 
depending partly on the technical capacities of our social institutions and partly on the degree of 
consensus that can be reached” within this community (more on that later). What we get at that 
stage is only a pressing invitation to depart from pure monetary/redistributive considerations: 
when fairness is at stake, what matters is access to certain goods. 
 
Now, taking those goods seriously invites us to go further than initial resources. Adopting 
a Rawlsian position at best offers, as Amartya Sen pointed out, a truncated approach to egalitari-
anism. Focusing on the initial distribution of goods (or resources) is important but instrumental. 
Life is a process, economic life is a “cycle” – as economists frequently assert – so that initial 
                                                 
42Schor (1998). 
43John Roemer (1996) categorically asserts that “finding an index (of primary goods) is a problem that Rawls does 
not solve … and it is a serious problem, for on it hangs Rawls’s claim that his theory is non welfarist”; Marc Fleur-
baey (2002) adopts a more nuanced position. More on this in section 5.   
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conditions, even under the best considered set of initial conditions, are no proper criterion for so-
cial justice. Even if there is no easy metric for assessing the different aspects of a good life, you 
need to refer to what a person does with her initial endowments or goods or resources. Looking 
for deeper foundations for justice, Amartya Sen introduces capabilities and functionings: you 
must consider not only availability of resources but the capacity to use them appropriately, not 
only freedom to choose between different goods, but freedom to build the set of options within 
which choices will be made. It’s no surprise that, when making a rare reference to historical situ-
ations in this book, A. K. Sen chooses to comment on the famous Franklin D. Roosevelt speech 
on the four freedoms. Freedom of choice as a consumer is one thing; more important is freedom 
to act as an agent.
44 Anyway, that leads to a focus on how economic life tends to expand or to re-
strict opportunities beyond preexisting constraints. What we get here is a pressing invitation not 
to limit our vision to the initial situation understood as a first round when consumers fully make 
their inter-temporal plans; the entire economic game is not settled at the beginning. Referring to 
capabilities and functionings rather calls for a vision based on lifetime sequences of risks and op-
portunities, including permanent interactions with others and future decisions depending from ir-
reversible consequences from the past as well as from unexpected situations and changing hori-
zons. 
 
Without further elaboration here, we recognize that modern political philosophy intro-
duces powerful theoretical arguments to distinguish {i} goods, whose production and distribu-
tion is without ambiguity properly ruled by market forces, from {I} goods whose very special 
feature is to have powerful inter-temporal and inter-personal properties: your future very much 
depends on what decisions you make today concerning acquiring skills, protecting your health, 
preparing for your retirement or preserving the environment, and that is naturally truer regarding 
your children. For these reasons, I will from now on call “IT-goods” those goods for which fair-
ness and efficiency considerations have to be put in balance.  
 
From an economic perspective, connecting today’s decisions with their medium-, long- or 
very-long-term consequences injects a lot of uncertainties into the decision process of any agent 
and in the supply/demand adjustment of any market. Remember that supply/demand adjustments 
are at their best when there is a simple metric – a price which summarizes all the needed infor-
mation for both participants – and it is doubtful that is the case here. Two major considerations 
actually derive from the inter-temporal nature of IT goods, which clearly explains why designing 
arrangements to govern their production and distribution is a preliminary issue preempting actual 
choices.  
 
First, huge difficulties face our standard consumer when preparing his decisions; many of 
the well-known restrictions facing the study of optimal individual behavior or the proper func-
                                                 
44This is an ideal which is very much present in the American tradition of the “self-supporting man.” Michael Sandel 
(1996) shows how strongly connected in this tradition were the notions of free labor and independent citizens; he in-
terprets the erosion of this tradition in the middle of the nineteenth century and proposes an extremely interesting 
discussion of how the typical wage earner of big industries – losing his position as a free laborer – had been later re-
stored as another expression of American values; free contract with the employer would finally be substituted to 
self-employment as proof of an unaffected independence (this discussion can interestingly be connected to what is 
said in section 7 concerning the role of the Supreme Court in labor contract cases at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, in particular the Lochner case). Finally, the expansion of the Keynesian economic policies after World War II 
is viewed by Michael Sandel as an impoverishment of citizenship and freedom which calls today for a renewed civic 
virtue.   
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tioning of competitive markets apply. Information is incomplete or costly or difficult to use prop-
erly. In this precarious situation, our educated consumer faces nothing but uncertainties about fu-
ture needs on the labor market, future returns on financial assets, future therapies to cope with 
progressively deteriorating health, future consequences of global warming. As we very well 
know, commensurability is the prerequisite of any rational theory of choice. If agents do not 
know the attributes of goods, economics clearly recognizes that we have to devote costly re-
sources to measure and monitor them. In sort of a D. North’s tradition, this is a sufficient argu-
ment to introduce institutions as necessarily completing market forces and consequently embed-
ding different conceptions of fairness.
45 Finally, many of these decisions introduce a flow of ex-
ternalities which is at best poorly reflected in the present parameters of choice. Here is a case for 
cautiously using the market as a tool to govern these goods.
46  
  
Second, IT goods have dynamic properties: they not only connect present and future lev-
els of utility or well-being or whatever, they contribute to defining who you will be tomorrow, 
what you will prefer, most importantly what your opportunities will be. For the different indi-
viduals in a community, their life-cycle story is not appropriately represented as a series of 
curves which you could derive from individual {1} to individual {n} through linear transforma-
tions; initial conditions and available choices give better or worse chances to get good jobs, to 
maintain a healthy way of life, to offer your children a good start, to prepare a gratifying retire-
ment. It is consequently no surprise that IT goods have strong and inevitable retroactions on 
equality. In those situations where market considerations alone decide your access to IT goods, 
access will be grossly unequal and, at the bottom of the ladder, your future opportunities will 
likely be severely reduced.  
 
We have argued that individuals differ as much in their initial endowments as in the sub-
sequent options they face and the way they will be able to react: similar situations will mean op-
portunities for some, constraints for others.
47 A suggestive presentation could refer to a produc-
tion function of anyone’s life path: anyone has an initial endowment, faces technical possibilities 
and his choices supposedly put him on the efficiency frontier. Referring to this parabola, my 
point here is that the appropriate production function is not a neoclassical one: I would prefera-
bly refer to a sort of endogenous theory of individual functionings: the better you start, the best 
use you make of available choices, the greater the rewards in the struggle for life. . . . And the 
more the resulting society comes close to a dynastic one where increasing social differentiation is 
the rule, social mobility the exception.
48  
                                                 
45Properly deciphering the environment is a major prerequisite of the rational choice theory, as H. Simon demon-
strated. Subsequently, D. North (1990), the Nobel Prize winner, argued that measurement and enforcement costs are 
the sources of political, social and economic institutions. There is probably no better example than the healthcare in-
dustry in this regard; more generally, IT goods are clearly extremely complex in these two aspects, measurement and 
enforcement: efficiency, and not only fairness, require institutions à la North. See following footnote. 
46The “mess” of the private healthcare system in the U.S. is not only recognized, (see Richmond and Fein), its huge 
excessive costs – as compared with foreign countries as established by the GAO – are clearly attributable to the inef-
ficient private structure of the industry. With European eyes, the affection of U.S. society for its health system re-
mains something more ideological than pragmatically informed: this is clearly exemplified by J. Cogan , R. Glenn 
Hubbard, and D. Kessler (2005) 
47Jacques Mistral and Bernard Salzmann (2006) follow this line to give an interpretation of the flexibility of the U.S. 
labor market. 
48Referring to special episodes of economic history could be illuminating in this regard: the Gilded Age, also desig-
nated as the age of “robber barons,” provides a lot of spectacular stories illustrating this idea of divergent life paths;   
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In short, IT goods can be the engine of divergent life paths, they are also powerful tools 
for implementing social fairness; in any case, they are not neutral intermediaries unambiguously 
delivering a general and fair equilibrium. For this reason, the nation as a whole is strongly inter-
ested in controlling these forces, which can endanger any vision of justice. This is clearly a case 
for introducing fairness considerations not only into individual choices, as altruist motives would 
suggest, but directly into the very framework of individual choices. This is why we turn now to 
institutions. 
 
5. Institutions as Embedded Preferences 
 
Taking “Collective Preferences” seriously is a demanding task because this is a particu-
larly suspicious concept: what are “preferences”? How could they be “collective”? Let us start 
with the second question. 
 
Aggregating individual preferences always bears  the  burden  of  original  sin  since  the                        
Arrow theorem. A huge literature developed to bypass the difficulties of aggregating individual 
preferences. Three of those efforts are valuable benchmarks in this research: 1.) the social wel-
fare function of Harsanyi (1955); 2.) the dual “selfish-altruist” self-invented by Margolis (1982); 
3.) the social ordering function of Fleurbaey and its implications for just institutions (2002). In-
teresting as are these efforts, aggregation of individual preferences as regards this research ends 
in a deadlock: as discussed earlier, the social European state is not a question of altruism, any-
thing “collective” in the European welfare state does not derive from aggregation.  
 
Preferences as well are recognized as an ambiguous concept. If we speak about choices, 
we can entirely dispense with this idea. On the other hand, there is the temptation to look to 
something “deeper” in some sense that lies behind and could explain actual choices.
49 Attempt-
ing to use preferences as an abstract basis for rational self-interest actually proves disappointing. 
We have every reason to think that preferences are shifting, that they depend on social norms, 
legal rules and endowments: presupposing given preferences does not help anyway.
50 Prefer-
ences are dependent on a context, that’s why economists retreated to revealed preferences. 
Should we consequently get rid of collective preferences? 
 
Now, let’s take a different approach: conversely, could the context be dependent on pref-
erences? After all, institutional and legal arrangements are precisely the means a nation uses to 
reach certain goals. People choose and act in this regard through elections, parliament and gov-
ernment. This is the way eventually to articulate the respective spheres of the market and of pub-
lic institutions: property rights, competition, and profit rule in the former; a workable conception 
of equity, a Weberian bureaucracy,
51 and political accountability in the later. But wait a minute: 
why should we be considering political solutions to essentially economic issues? 
 
It is true that healthcare is nothing less than an industry: it is all about costs, investments, 
drugs, skills, research, management on the supply side and individual choices on the demand 
                                                                                                                                                               
Hearst Castle in California has possible parallels in Europe (Neuschwanstein, for example); the latter is a political 
story of the past, the former, a pure product of modern economics.  
49Cass Sunstein (1997). 
50Even within a purely welfarist view, one might explore the idea that promoting welfare is not only a matter of 
satisfying given preferences but is also a matter of promoting certain types of preferences. 
51The reference to Ezra Suleiman (2003) is more than appropriate here.   
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side. Pensions as well seem to be the quintessentially financial problem of a life-cycle, a matter 
of financial products and personal responsibility. True enough, but, as emphasized in section 2, 
there is a choice here between mainly private or public provisions in organizing insurance pro-
grams
52. This is the point where economics and politics interfere, and this has become one of the 
most active research areas in the last decades; Persson and Tabellini (1998) have offered an out-
standing contribution to this field to which I refer now.  
 
Political economics precisely explores questions raised by economic policies in modern 
democracies: typically, what determines the size and form of redistributive programs or the ex-
tent and type of public goods provision. These are seemingly the sort of positive questions I am 
dealing with in this research, questions about the way policy works, not the way it should work. 
These models bring analytical clarity into some aspects of the political process (the median 
voter, the role of special interests…), they also deliver unambiguous conclusions regarding how 
electoral politics interfere with economics and I’ll briefly mention two of them. A well-known 
result of this literature is that the size of redistributive programs increases with pretax income in-
equality. This seems quite intuitive if we consider that the median income is lower than the aver-
age income;
53 in that case, democracy is a way to express the interest of the middle class personi-
fied by the median voter.
54 About pensions, people’s preferences are supposed to be monotonic 
in age and income, older and poorer voters are always preferring a higher value of pensions; con-
sequently, the model predicts that pensions will redistribute from the rich to the poor (the median 
voter effect again) and from the young to the aged at the expense of future generations. Connect-
ing this sort of prediction with actual situations proves demanding; we can certainly expect from 
further research a better consistency between the models and the data.  
 
But a more serious limitation of this approach has a particular significance for this re-
search: political economics build models where agents decide within existing political institu-
tions. Persson and Tabellini, for example, underline that “they refrain from seeking positive ex-
planations for the structure of these institutions.” I agree with them that institutions are a product 
of history and that they are slow to change. The analytical consequence of this restriction is that 
these interpretations are designed to describe – or recommend – marginal changes within given 
or between similar political institutions, not to compare significantly different political institu-
tions, which is precisely what is at stake in this paper.
55 In other words, we are invited here to 
distinguish carefully between two models, voters deciding a parameter (for redistribution, for 
pensions…) within a given framework and voters, in some sense in a preexisting situation, de-
                                                 
52I disagree in this respect with Michael Walzer (1988), who summarizes the welfare state “as a system of national-
ized distribution, out of private control and now provided to all,” even if this condemnation is pronounced in the 
name of a highly idealized ambition of personal autonomy and voluntary mobilization, the later proposed as a way 
“for citizens to control and shape the delivery of welfare services.” 
53This is the well-known result of Richard Meltzer in 1981. 
54More precisely, it is interesting here to refer to the comments of Persson and Tabellini, who carefully distinguish 
this measure of income inequality from other ones; would extreme poverty and extreme wealth coexist, the interest 
of the middle class would be different from those mentioned above; Persson and Tabellini do not refer to the recent 
trends in income distribution in the U.S., which could be possibly interpreted that way. 
55Take pretax income distribution: income inequality (measured by median/average income) is higher in the U.S. 
than in Europe (section 2); the model we have briefly quoted in the text predicts that redistribution should be higher 
in the U.S., in opposition to the actual situation. We do not infer that the model is “wrong,” we recognize that it is 
not designed to explain this difference. T. Iversen and D. Soskice (2005) make a good step toward explaining (main-
ly through proportional representation) the frequently commented on positive correlation between more equal distri-
bution and high levels of redistribution.   
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ciding what will be the framework for their future choices. This distinction is more than helpful 
to go a step further in our understanding of how different sort of policies or institutions can re-
flect different conceptions of fairness. 
 
Preferences are an ambiguous concept insofar as they are conceived as a background for 
individual rational choice; they have a very different aspect when they are seen as part of a de-
mocratic process which does not make choices, but fixes the institutional framework for individ-
ual choices. At that stage, we come back to Rawls, according to whom the subject matter of so-
cial justice is precisely the basic structure of society understood as the major institutions that 
“distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social 
cooperation.” By major institutions, he understands “the political constitution and the major eco-
nomic and social arrangements … [that] taken together as one scheme … influence their life 
prospects [and] what they can expect to be.” In a market economy, consumers express choices in 
the market place; in a democracy, citizens precisely express judgments about the preferred or-
ganization of the economic structure. Politics clearly balances between diverging interests (poor 
vs. rich) but has a more prominent and exclusive role in solving collective action problems. Indi-
vidual agents have little control over social norms, social meanings and social roles. When it 
comes to design and embrace a sense of fairness, they face a collective action problem which is 
at the roots of democracy.
56 Political deliberation and decision is the democratic way to deliver a 
considered judgment about justice; enacting law is the way to make it a social reality. These will 
be the themes developed in the two following sections.  
 
Collective preferences, as I understand them in the present exercise, finally have nothing 
to do either with the aggregation of individual preferences or with bargaining in a political arena. 
Building a social safety net is not a question of altruism but, for everyone, of considered interest. 
Citizens make judgments not only for themselves but for the entire community. Politics is a place 
to translate aspirations and principles as well as interests and conflicts into practical arrange-
ments, this is where individual and collective interests mix. As voters, citizens naturally express 
their own interests but they also express a sense of the public good. In these conditions, a social 
insurance system appears not only rational but possibly desirable.  
 
As an aside, referring to the veil of ignorance appears here as a suggestive idea. By this, I 
refer to an initial position where there are known knowns (the high cost of health or education), 
known unknowns (life expectancy or financial returns) and one major unknown unknown: voters 
are ignoring how successfully they will perform in the economic game. Endowed with a rational 
expectations model of the dynamic properties of IT goods, voters could rationally express their 
preference for institutions which will circumscribe market forces and consequently guarantee a 
level playing field during their life cycle. I clearly recognize that this is suggestive rather than 
demonstrative because of the well-known limits of the veil methodology (which in effect were 
recognized by John Rawls himself). In “Political Liberalism,” John Rawls asserts that it would 
be a mistake “to suppose that justice as fairness attempts to select principles of justice purely on 
the basis of a conception of rational choice as understood in economics or decision theory”: there 
is a question of judgment, not only of rationality. We consequently need to look elsewhere if we 
                                                 
56Jon Elster (1989) is an interesting introduction to the difficult questions raised at this intersection of collective ac-
tion and social norms. It is not surprising that his reflection for this book started from an investigation about the 
Swedish welfare state.   
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want to elucidate the origins of different conceptions of the public good. The following section is 
devoted to a first exploration of this issue. 
 
6. Two Roads to Fairness 
  
Until now, I have argued about the possibility for a nation democratically to prefer sub-
tracting the production and distribution of certain goods heavily loaded with egalitarian concerns 
to market forces. Does that necessarily mean that societies which circumscribe markets would be 
more “fair”? Does this imply that the political sphere is more “democratic” than the market? The 
answer to both questions is no: it all depends on the conception of the public good. Now the fas-
cinating question is: what is the basis for such different collective preferences? Can we really 
conceive of two widely different and well articulated conceptions of the public good? Here, I 
need very precisely to distinguish between the empirical and the theoretical aspects of these 
questions. 
 
I am afraid that empirical observations, even if they are well-inspired and not polemical, 
do not go very far. It is probably fair to summarize many available descriptions as emphasizing 
American
57 as well as European “exceptionalisms.” The huge superstructure of the welfare state 
in Europe is frequently understood as a product of the increasing influence of social-democratic 
ideas after World War II, a very special set of circumstances in history. A surprising point here is 
that conservative parties in Europe – except in the UK under Mrs. Thatcher
58 – never succeeded 
and never even really tried to push back the tide of social expenditures and regulations. Euro-
peans’ attitudes clearly seem more deeply rooted than simply in partisan political differences.
59 
By contrast, the narrowness of welfare policy in the U.S. is attributed to a lack of popular sup-
port
60 largely due to specifically American ethnic character.
61 Well, with two exceptionalisms, 
isn’t one in excess? Anyway, the striking aspect here is not so much the extent of the welfare 
state as its institutions.  
 
I consequently dismiss the two most frequent views in the public debate: 1) that Europe is 
the model of a civilized capitalist economy, mixing market efficiency with social considerations 
to which the U.S. remains strangely hostile; 2) that the U.S. is the model of a market-driven 
economy, a model that Europe has never been able to adhere to, with dangerous consequences 
for its future now that globalization forces have been unleashed. Such generalizations are over-
simplifications. Looking at America and Europe is not only a question of practical curiosity and 
media reporting. Could such significantly different preferences have only accidental, circumstan-
tial explanations? This is an invitation to develop a theoretical argument. If you accept the idea 
that both continents share the same founding values,
62 could it be that these values are enshrined 
into two different systemic interpretations?  
 
                                                 
57Louis Hartz (1955) remains a good introduction to the idea that “the American experience is unique.”  
58For reasons which I will make explicit in another piece. 
59It has been previously observed that Christian Democratic parties played a prominent role in the conception and 
implementation of the social state in Europe; if there is any single term to summarize the European way, it is proba-
bly “Sozial-Marktwirtschaft,” which was carved out by Ludwig Erhard.  
60“It didn’t happen there” is the well-known title of Seymour Martin Lipset’s essay to explain “why socialism failed 
in the U.S.” 
61Martin Gilens (2000). 
62They are “the free world,” as recently emphasized by Timothy Garton Ash (2004).   
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Western culture is based in this regard on the two concepts of Liberty and Equality.
63 
This really is a big picture, but nations necessarily have their deepest roots in a profound vision 
of the social good, whatever the difficulties of its implementation. As regards the social fabric, 
the vision is about justice. Some sort of patriotism à la Renan, a shared attraction towards relig-
ion can certainly fuel a deep sense of community which can have an effect on equality. Patriot-
ism and religion
64 certainly have a role, sometimes a major one, but it is difficult to see them as 
the cement of present modern democracies.
65 And democracy is precisely the political system in 
which voters can check the (relative) adequacy between their shared values on the one hand, and 
individual liberties and government action on the other. Could it be that, growing from the com-
mon trunk of western political and moral philosophy, two different articulations of liberty and 
equality emerge in the modern world? This question cannot be answered in a simple empirical 
way; what we need to do is to develop two models making explicit the coherence of the whole 
set of concepts which embodies these basic values. 
 
Gertrud Himmelfarb (2004) recently gave a new and vibrant freshness to the idea of “two 
different roads to modernity”; this is stimulating reading because the case for this theoretical dis-
tinction cannot be made more forcefully, even if, in Ms. Himmelfarb’s expressions, it frequently 
turns close to the polemical.
66 I will consequently offer a possibly less subtle but more balanced 
interpretation. On the one side, we have the great English philosophical tradition; its master 
words are “natural rights”; there is nothing above individual liberty and property; government is 
at best an accepted sacrifice. On the other side, there is another great tradition which sees society 
as predating every interpersonal arrangement; liberties are made possible by the very existence 
of a social contract; laws which protect property rights and property, which make markets a real-
ity, are the products of government action.
67 
 
Enlightenment is clearly not a monolith and I will try to summarize these two roads to 
modernity through a series of alternate concepts which will be introduced after two caveats: 1) I 
will limit myself to the economic aspect of these differences and make no reference to political 
rights and concepts; 2) It would be pompous and presumptuous at that stage to make references 
                                                 
63This section owes a lot to Bernard Bailyn (1992), “The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution.” For dif-
ferent reasons, Herbert McClosky and John Zaller (1984), Harold Hyman (1986), and Richard Ellis (1993), as well 
as Barry Shain (1994), Michael Sandel (1996), and Robert Putnam (2000), helped to frame the historical, socio-
logical and political basis of the abstract ideas audaciously introduced in this section. 
64The weight of individual, charitable and religious motivations towards welfare in America is an important element 
in this picture and it deserves a full investigation. Close to economic preoccupations and formulations, K. Scheve 
and D. Stasavage (2005) argue that religion and welfare spending are substitute mechanisms that insure individuals 
against adverse life events. In historical and theological terms, it will be interesting to discuss in another piece the 
different forms of Protestantism that can be distinguished between America and Europe; Methodism, for example, is 
a very American way of mixing social, spiritual, and ethnical considerations (see R. Richey et alii (1993) without 
equivalent in the Calvinist/Lutheran European sphere of influence; naturally, this could be interestingly linked to – 
and distinguished from – the Weberian vision of Protestantism with its emphasis on efficiency considerations. In 
practical terms, J. Bartkowski and H. Regis (2003) propose an empirical analysis of the implementation of faith-
based poverty relief initiatives in the South. See also the reference to R. Fogel in the following footnote. 
65This could be seen as a secular European view. By contrast, Robert Fogel, the Nobel Prize winner, offers a system-
atic, and frequently spectacular, vision of the successive religious awakenings in the U.S.; according to Fogel, the 
present “post-modern egalitarian agenda” is no longer concerned with food or shelter but centered on “a struggle for 
the distribution of spiritual resources.” 
66Gertrud Himmelfarb ardently restores “the enlightenment to its progenitor, the British” who are the source of a 
“compassionate and realistic philosophy” at war with “the French ideology of reason.”  
67More on this issue in section 7.   
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to great authors who can inspire this comparison; as an amateur in the field, I modestly propose 
the following table as a sort of excursion on the “Philosophenweg” which mainly summarizes – 
and hopefully enlightens – the different concepts we have introduced until now (cf. table on the 
following page).  
 
As a tribute to English philosophy – and to economics – it is interesting to start with utili-
tarianism which plays such a huge role as a cornerstone of its political tradition … and which 
never made such an impression on the continent, where you would find, rather, critical apprecia-
tions of the basis and scope of utility. If looking for an alternate concept, you would preferably 
use capabilities, even if it is a modern invention. It fits rather well with what could be seen as the 
cornerstone of continental European political philosophy, citizenship, where the individual is not 
perceived as a utility-measuring atom but as part of a social contract. From there derive two dif-
ferent visions of liberty and cooperation: on the continent, freedom will be associated with a 
broad interpretation of how the citizen is integrated into the political and social fabric; perfect 
equality cannot be a reality, but it is an ideal; and liberty for one stops where it impedes other to 
have equal access to what is considered as part of citizenship. Across the Channel, or the Ocean, 
you would probably prefer to see the individual endowed with his property – a natural right de-
rived from his labor (or from his sword); freedom is first of all freedom to contract with others in 
the marketplace, and in any case freedom from the government. Starting from there, the idea of 
solidarity comes relatively high on the continental road to modernity, the prestige of the entre-
preneur – despite the origin of the word – is running much ahead in the American tradition. At-
titudes towards risk (or security) are part of the two models, one emphasizing the economic 
benefits of risk taking, the other the social benefits of equal protection against risk.
68 Finally, it is 
more than appropriate to introduce the relation between market and state in a form where the 




As I said, this is no more than a modest excursion. I am referring to “models” as econo-
mists usually do: a coherent articulation of different pieces which have all their own logic and 
scope and which fit together because there is a series of well identifiable connections. Introduc-
ing fairness considerations in the social fabric finally appears at the roots of two different politi-
cal economies. Promoting market forces as extensively as possible and correcting their possibly 
undesirable outcomes through punctual interventions is one solution; the political philosophy 
which supports this view is a Liberal-market Political-philosophy (LMP-P). Another solution re-
lies on a process where equality concerns call for more universal solutions that invite mixing 
                                                 
68The importance of social, cultural, or ethnic factors to explain the extent of redistributive policies has been empha-
sized in the recent literature, possibly at the expense of this more traditional and more fundamental goal of a safety 
net taking the form of social insurance; T. Cusack, T. Iversen and P. Rehm (2005) make a strong case for restoring 
the theoretical and empirical importance of risk in social choices.  
69Here I try to summarize the rationale of two alternative “models” or Weltanschaungen. I am confident that the co-
herence of the elements is a robust part of the picture. Other aspects of the presentation clearly need more scrutiny. 
In particular, it could very well be that American and European values (regarding equality) are not so different but 
that the two continents significantly differ in their appreciation of the role of the government for achieving this goal, 
so that what could be hastily perceived as major moral differences could come down to a difference in views about 
what it is legitimate for the state to do. In empirical terms, there is clearly a significant part of truth here; but my pre-
sentation suggests that, theoretically speaking, the role of the state should not be considered so independently from 
the other components, as a deus ex machina. Anyway, I agree that more is needed on this point; a step further is of-
fered in section 7 with the introduction of the legal system. I thank Peter Hall for helpful comments on this issue.   
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market and non-market solutions in a way that allows for the pursuit of democratically recog-
nized goals; the political philosophy which supports circumscribing market forces in that way 
could be qualified as a Social-market Political-philosophy (SMP-P).  
 
 
The interesting thing is that neither of these models can be easily qualified as more “fair” 
or more “democratic” than the other. The only result we can derive from our construction is that 
extending the sphere of the market as far as possible can be desirable but is not unequivocally 
desirable, and that this is, in any case, a political choice and not a purely economic issue. I find 
more it than appropriate at this stage to cite Ronald Dworkin: “the market when it enters enters 
in a more positive and a more servile way. It enters because it is endorsed by the concept of 
equality as the best means at least to a point to meet the fundamental requirements [of the soci-
ety]. . . . But the value of actual market transactions ends just at that point and the market must 
be abandoned or constrained when analysis shows that it has failed in this task or that an entirely 
different institutional device would do better.” In that sense, the two preceding sections have suc-
cessively demonstrated the possibility and the rationality of engaging socioeconomic fairness 
along two distinct avenues. What remains to be done is to understand if and how these different 
preferences can actually be implemented.  
 
7. Legal Expression of Different Preferences 
 
If we accept the idea of two broad and different conceptions of social justice inspiring 
modern market-based democracies, the next question is: how could these preferences be imple-
mented? Actual institutions like a social safety net are so far away from philosophical prescrip-
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tions that we cannot expect any easy connection to actual social choices.
70 But a second look 
could deliver a less pessimistic assessment: it could very well be that the distance between these 
two spheres is smaller than is usually perceived. Actually, there is a natural bridge between a 
nation’s deepest aspirations as a community and its day-to-day operations as a myriad of agents: 
this bridge is the legal system. The legal system keeps the highest values of a nation enshrined in 
its Constitution; and the judiciary is the link between these principles and the complex practi-
calities of day-to-day economics. Could different legal systems both express and empower Col-
lective Preferences as previously defined?
71 This is what I want now to explore briefly. 
 
This connection clearly is anything but new: in recent years, part of it has been carefully 
and extensively explored by the “Law and economics” program. Asserting the primacy of effi-
ciency over distribution in analyzing private law is the more recognizable emphasis of “Law and 
economics,”
72 treating the impact of legal rules as incentive mechanisms its main tool,
73 and pro-
moting the inviolability of individuals’ economic rights its major normative position. In that 
sense, Law and economics seems perfectly fitted with the left column of the previous table, LMP-
P. Without entering into a detailed argument, this is brilliantly and powerfully demonstrated, 
among others, by Richard Epstein
74 in his analysis of private property, or by Richard Posner, 
whose wealth maximization approach “allows a reconciliation among utility, liberty and even 
equality as competing ethical principles, an approach – Posner specifies – which seems to have 
played an important role in the growth of the common law.”
75  
 
This movement has recently grown as a dominant force in legal academia in the U.S. Its 
affirmation of novelty is methodologically visible in many aspects; but it is doubtful that it 
would have no precedent at all. The strong relationship between law and economics had had a 
first expression with the Realist school heralded by Robert Hale.
76 Legal realism, as well as 
institutional economics, was born from a reaction against laissez-faire.
77 Following Barbara 
Fried, the Realists’ main achievement was to “debunk the notion of a free-standing, self-
regulating market by showing that the market was ineluctably constituted by the legal regime in 
which it operated.” The roots of this Realist critique are to be found in the two pillars of laissez-
faire constitutionalism (from the late nineteenth century until the 1930s) with its insistence on 
                                                 
70Political philosophers are well aware of this distance and generally prefer not to engage in practical debates; a 
worthwhile exception is Philippe van Parisj (2005) offering a strong argument in favor of the “universal allocation.” 
71The analysis of “Legal Origins” offered by E. Glaeser and A. Shleifer ( 2001) very much stimulated this part of the 
research. 
72In terms of international comparisons, the economic analysis of law stimulated a vast research program which ulti-
mately found its way to the well known World Bank Reports, “Doing Business.” The Reports rightly emphasize the 
importance of appropriate institutions for sustaining successful development; they have been severely criticized for 
methodological weaknesses regarding the data, as well as the implicit model which unfairly denigrates civil law; see 
G. Canivet and M.A. Frison-Roche (2005). 
73Viewed from the economic side of the world, it is certainly a good point. But legal rules in fact provide more than 
incentives: they express preferences and they change people in a continuous process of retroaction; see C. Sunstein 
(1997).  
74In his analysis of the Takings clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
75Richard Posner (1981),  p. 115. 
76Barbara Fried (1998); I also refer in this paragraph to Cass Sunstein (2004). Fried describes R. Hale as “the head of 
the first law and economics movement.”  
77Robert Hale began his academic life as an economist and is said by Barbara Fried to have kept strong ties to insti-
tutionalist economists as T. Veblen or J. M. Clark (p. 10).   
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freedom to contract (as an expression of individual liberty) and private property.
78 But it would 
be a mistake to read the Realists’ work only as of historical interest. They were preoccupied, as 
we are, by the appropriate limits of individual rights in a market-based democracy. The move-
ment in that sense not only remains a trenchant rejoinder to some of the most reductive attacks 
on the moral legitimacy of the welfare state,
79 it brings a well articulated support to the idea that, 
in modern economies, a fundamental part of people’s rights can only be granted under the pro-
tection of the state.
80 
 
Now, what do modern constitutions say and what does the comparison between Europe 
and the U.S. suggest in this regard?
81 There is a growing literature focusing on the economic as-
pects of constitutions; the majority perspective among economists tries to understand the emer-
gence of successful constitutions delivering both human rights for citizens and an appropriate 
framework for market forces
82 or, at a more advanced stage of economic development, to estab-
lish causal relations between specific aspects of the constitutions and policy outcomes.
83 The 
central role of the Constitution is, for example, well recognized by Alesina and Glaeser in their 
study of American and European redistributive policies. Their attention is mainly focused on the 
U.S. Constitution; extending their remarks to a comparison with Europe is what I want to explore 
now.  
 
A striking aspect of modern constitutions is the addition of one formulation or another of 
social goals or “positive rights” to the traditional negative ones.
84 This is a striking difference be-
tween European constitutions and the American one, which is lacking similar formulations.
85 
The present constitutions of France and Germany for example – but the same could be said of 
                                                 
78The “famous (or infamous)” 1905 Supreme Court’s decision in Lochner vs. New York is the most extensively 
commented point in this field; I refer to R. Dworkin (p. 179), B. Fried (p. 32), C. Fried (p. 174), P. Irons (chap. 20). 
79Cass Sunstein quotes Robert Hale as saying that “property rights are in effect a delegation of public power” (p. 
23), a position which he interestingly enough traces back to J. Bentham himself. 
80“The victory of the central government, the creation of a central government was a haven of refuge to the individ-
ual”; this is no expression of a classical French statist view but of Franklin D. Roosevelt, cited by Cass Sunstein 
from an extraordinary speech delivered in San Francisco (1932). 
81There is no better introduction here than Frank Michelman (2005a) who discusses different aspects of the idea that 
different constitutional devices in Europe and the U.S. express or could express significant ideological divides; he 
rightly points out that the deciding fact should be to check the effectiveness of these devices to constrain public ac-
tors to desired levels of performance. The present reflection precisely tries to introduce explicitly this desired level 
of  “performance” in the argument. 
82D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson (2005). 
83T. Perrson and G. Tabellini (2005). 
84Following World War II, a large international consensus finally summarized these principles in the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, of which one aspect deserves particular attention at that stage: without underestimating 
the role of many actors, such as Charles Malik in particular, it is worthwhile to underline the Franco-American influ-
ence through the continuously prominent roles of Eleanor Roosevelt and René Cassin. See M. A. Glendon (2001) 
and E. Pateyron (1998) for two slightly different restitutions of this important step towards a new world era (and no-
tice their appreciations of the respective roles played by Eleanor Roosevelt and René Cassin). 
85Frank Michelman (2005b) emphasizes that the American legal system “had ripened to maturity over a period run-
ning through the mid-twentieth century.” Following Cass Sunstein (2004), it is more than conceivable that this ma-
turity could have developed in a “second bill of rights.” On the other hand,  A. E. Dick Howard (1990) presents evi-
dence that, even if in the second part of the twentieth century, precisely when the Supreme Court had been bolder in 
using its power of judicial review to bolster individual rights, it has done so mainly through decisions which lie 
within the tradition of limiting the government’s power over individuals.    
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many others, like Spain or even of “new European” countries like the Czech Republic – define 
the Republic as “democratic and social.” The exact references are the following:
86 
 
France, preamble: The French People solemnly proclaims its fidelity to the Droits 
de l’homme as defined by the 1789 Declaration, confirmed and completed by the 
preamble of the Constitution of 1946. . . . article 2: France is an indivisible, secular, 
democratic and social Republic.  
 
Germany, article 20: The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social 
federal state… article 23: With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal 
Republic of Germany participates in the development of the European Union that is 
committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law and to the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
 
Lawyers are understandably uncomfortable with “social rights” for different reasons: a 
comparison with negative rights is useful to discard two frequent interpretations and put the 
question of positive rights on a more robust stage.
87 I shall make three successive points: 
 
  • First, the most frequently mentioned difference is that human rights (freedom of con-
science, freedom of speech …) seem nothing less than natural rights in our modern democracies, 
while social rights would be of a more political – implicitly more debatable not to say partisan – 
nature. There is an element of truth here, but not much: everywhere, including Britain and Amer-
ica, the fundamental rights of the human person have been the product of a long intellectual ela-
boration (the enlightenment again) and of an insurrection against prevailing established powers
88 
under which, be it the Church or the Prince, the sole individual right was submission. This first 
expression of a major difference thus proves fundamentally deceitful: recognizing social rights in 
principle is no more “political” than asserting fundamental rights only because the latest are pro-
foundly political ones.  
 
• A second difference allows some progress but leaves the comparison still unsatisfying. 
Negative rights are said to be directly enforceable, social rights not so. There is also an element 
of truth. Rights are definitely not aspirations. Citizens are entitled to expect that independent 
judges will ensure that their recognized rights are actually protected against the power of the 
government (U.S. Constitution). How could you imagine that, whatever the general social right, 
the right to decent housing, for example, could be brought to a court? There is a point here: if (a 
big “if,” as we shall see), if enforcement of rights is identified with the work of the courts, it 
might justify not including such rights in a Constitution which is a legal document. 
 
• A third difference will finally prove more useful. The proper recognition and definition 
of both categories of rights do not encounter similar conceptual and political difficulties.
89 Brief-
ly said, human rights proved recognizable simply by being qualified (freedom of speech); they 
                                                 
86Completing footnote 81, it is interesting to quote the corresponding article of the Universal Declaration (article 
22): “Everyone, as a member of a society, has the right to social security and is entitled, ... in accordance with the 
organization and resources of each state, to the realization of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable 
for his dignity and the free development of his personality.” 
87The following paragraphs would clearly be enriched by better integrating legal reasoning as developed by Frank 
Michelman (2003b). 
88An interesting chapter of B. Bailyn (1992) is entitled “The Logic of Rebellion.” 
89This explains the “element of truth” I have just mentioned in the two previous paragraphs.   
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subsequently have to be introduced as such in the law of the land; naturally, the formulation will 
prove ambiguous in practical situations; it will precisely be thereafter to the courts to specify and 
protect them in particular cases.
90 In summary, there is an immediate congruence between the 
political philosophy which inspires these rights and the legal system which, in a democracy, is 
their natural protector. The same cannot be said of social rights. This difference in nature invites 
us to enrich our understanding of how social rights are recognized, defined and finally enforced. 
 
The fundamental difficulty raised by introducing social rights can spectacularly be made 
visible through two unexpectedly similar references by Maximilien Robespierre and Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. Robespierre, in 1793, asserted that the revolution’s goal was to promote two funda-
mental rights: “liberty and the means simply to exist”; Roosevelt, in his 1936 acceptance speech 
in Philadelphia,
91 famously quoted an old English judge (“necessitous men are not free men”) 
before promising to defend freedom and “the right to live.” This common reference to the “right 
to live” in the mouths of both the French revolutionary and the American president is a fascinat-
ing starting point to elucidate the political construction which leads to the recognition of social 
rights.  
 
What does it imply for a nation to be organized in order to allow everyone to “live out of 
necessity”? There is clearly a difference of nature with the enforcement of “freedom of speech.”
 
92 I see three major steps to implementing any conception of “freedom from want” – which we 
suppose for simplicity to have already gained a philosophical (or political or religious or what-
ever) expression: 
 
• First, there is a democratic test: this particular conception needs to gather sufficient mo-
mentum to be supported by a majority; 
 
• Second, there is a legal test: those rights have to be expressed, enacted and implemented 
in appropriate institutional and legal terms; 
 
• Third, there is an economic test: those rights have to prove compatible with the require-
ments of a market economy. 
 
When these conditions are fulfilled, the conclusion appears quite clear: rights are not ex-
pressed in purely legal terms; their enforcement is not only the judiciary’s job; the relationship 
between law and politics can work in different ways.  
 
The U.S. Supreme Court is an extremely interesting body in this regard, both the highest 
level of the judiciary and sort of a political body.
93 By this, I mean that it makes decisions about 
issues which in every other democracy would be in the hands of elected representatives: civil 
rights, abortion, or, for our purposes, social legislation. And the Constitution seemingly proved 
flexible enough to cut the political debate in one sense, or, in another time, in the opposite, just 
as you expect partisan majorities to do. The result is an extraordinary historical course where the 
                                                 
90I refer to Ch. Fried, chapter 4: “Speech,” where the foundations of freedom of speech are laid, the principle being 
afterwards put within a broader doctrine and finally applied to the evaluation of practical cases: defamation, sex, flag 
burning… 
91http://www.cfinst.org/eguide/PartyConventions/speeches/1936d.html 
92By that, I mean that there is no direct congruence (as previously analyzed regarding freedom of speech) between 
the political philosophy which inspires such a view and the political, institutional or legal means of implementing it. 
93D. O’Brien (1990) even describes the Court as a “fundamentally political institution.”   
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Court proved frequently on the liberty side of the western equation rather than on the equality 
side (the already mentioned Lochner Court). True enough, that did not forbid decisions moving 
the U.S. in the welfarist direction in the New Deal area and in other aspects after World War II;
94 
does that mean, as Cass Sunstein eloquently suggests, that “a second bill of rights” was (or still 
could be) in the making? 
 
The most interesting point in this regard is the power associated with this political role: 
the power to apply a negative conception of rights is, almost by definition, a negative power. Re-
garding the wide range of issues related to social rights, the Justices can give way to political de-
cisions or kill them; they cannot promote those rights and they have no budget competence even-
tually to back them. Europeans expect laws, not courts, and representatives, not judges, to en-
force positive rights. Have a brief look to the “right to health” in European countries.
95 How did 
this extremely vague notion come into the institutional and legal reality whose results were de-
scribed in section 2? The three criteria I have previously introduced help understand the rationale 
behind the historical and political process (the path dependence story): following decades of po-
litical debates, citizens came to a relatively clear understanding of what this right is about and 
assumed that it would not be best served by market forces; voters democratically expressed such 
preferences and politicians enacted laws to circumscribe the market in this particular sphere. 
Finally, the test for sustainability, in this model, is that the political process delivers positive re-
sults in the three above described dimensions: the distribution and financing of health services 
are considered as fair; the democratic machinery insures accountability and adaptation; the pro-
duction side is efficiently connected to the rest of the economy.
96  
 
What makes a high level of “redistribution” sustainable in Europe finally could very well 
be due to the fact that it precisely takes a different avenue than redistribution. It is likely that 
European social states would not be what they are if their tax logic really were what economic 
textbooks describe: “tax the rich and give to the poor.” The implicit consequence is that the gen-
erous welfare state is legitimate and sustainable because it is grounded in a set of insurance insti-
tutions; this is both an expression of and a limit to its redistributive character. This could be seen 
as a paradox. But the paradox goes further and the idea that insiders in Europe fight to maintain 
their privileges, which is possibly right in some quarters of the economy, is definitely wrong as a 
general description of the system; even if redistribution is not its explicit goal, fair institutions 
prove, as the data clearly demonstrate, a far better way for promoting a fair production and dis-
tribution of IT goods and consequently for keeping inequalities under control. 
 
                                                 
94I refer to Peter Iron’s chapters 23 and 24 and to Cass Sunstein, chapters 8 (“America’s pragmatic constitution”) 
and 9 (“How the Supreme Court [almost] quietly adopted the second bill”). 
95As stated in France in the preamble to the 1946 Constitution, which is part of what the Constitutional Court relies 
on to make its decisions and calls the “block of constitutionality.” In Germany, statutory health insurance is pro-
vided under the Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung (GKV) initiated in 1883 and progressively extended to nearly 
everyone. 
96By that, I mean that research, management, wages, division of labor, productivity … are determined in line with 
standard business practices in the economy. As we described in section 2, these economic elements are summarized 
in the premium paid by socially insured agents to cover these costs. Remember at that stage that the cost-benefit 




For two hundred years, the gains from trade made possible by increasing specialization 
and division of labor have been the cornerstone of economic theory; increased productivity and 
higher levels of consumption have been the rewards of this long-term confidence in market effi-
ciency. And those economies which did not trust this role paid – and continue to pay – a really 
high price. But the long line of economists who built this approach into an elegant body of eco-
nomic theory possibly did so without sufficient regard for the consequences this exchange pro-
cess could have when broadly considering human affairs. Choices made in the market place do 
not cover every aspect of life. Introducing collective preferences has deep implications when bal-
ancing efficiency and fairness considerations.  
 
I have emphasized the inter-temporal properties of those goods with which the welfare 
state is most concerned. By comparison with other goods, like airlines or telecommunications, 
economics recognizes the many difficulties which in those activities affect both behaviors and 
market adjustments. Economics consequently has less powerful arguments to justify its usual 
conclusion that market forces are the engine of optimal social results. Inter-temporal goods also 
strongly retroact on equality. Modern political philosophy invites considering both efficiency and 
fairness considerations in the production and distribution of those goods. These two arguments 
set the stage for the possibility of different preferences regarding the way market and non-market 
solutions coexist in a market-based democracy. In effect, we found in the western tradition two 
deeply rooted visions of the Liberty/Equality couple, which can be formulated in two different 
political philosophies and finally be reflected in two different legal systems. 
 
It is clear that many of those remarks are tentative or suggestive rather than demonstra-
tive. A lot of work remains to be done in many directions. The actual comparison between the 
two continents is in itself a life-long adventure. The economic argument regarding insurance as 
opposed to redistribution has to be both extended and refined. Normative theories of justice have 
been introduced in a way which will appear excessively audacious to many. The distinction be-
tween two roads to fairness proved suggestive but really is a first and feeble approximation of 
what the idea could deliver. And finally, the development of a vision completing the “Law and 
economics” approach, which proved so successful in recent years, is a promising perspective of 
which I only offered a first sketch. All this is a research program rather than a working paper. 
But to fruitfully explore these different aspects, it was a prerequisite to have a robust starting 
point. The conclusion at that stage is in line with the title of the paper: efficiency and fairness 
considerations can mix in different, well-identified, and sensible ways. Market forces do not 
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